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The most polarizing statute regulating the internet is § 230 
of the Communications Decency Act.  Critics of § 230 do not like 
that the statute provides broad immunity to website operators 
when third parties post on their sites, while advocates for § 230 
market the statute as promoting free speech on the internet and 
preventing website operators from being subject to endless 
liability.  Critics view the statute as the sole problem, and the 
advocates view § 230 as the savior for these website operators.  
But the problem of hate speech and hurtful content online is 
immense and requires expensive investment by these companies 
to mitigate misinformation and harmful content.  We need to 
incentivize companies to invest in content moderation, tools, and 
 
* My name is Noah Hale, and I am a law student at the Elisabeth Haub School 
of Law at Pace University.  I am an Executive Productions Editor of PACE LAW 
REVIEW, and I want to thank PACE LAW REVIEW for giving me the opportunity 
to write this article and for all the help they have provided along the way.  I 
am also grateful for my family, friends, and faculty who were supportive of me 
while writing this article. 
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personnel that will flag and remove dangerous content while 
being careful to not scare these companies with potentially 
endless liability and overwhelming costs.  With so many tech 
companies struggling to achieve profitability, the solution lies in 
making content moderation less expensive in the short-term.  
Website operators should get a tax credit in the short-term to help 
bear the brunt of initial investments into content moderation.  
Once website operators have established artificial intelligence to 
flag and remove dangerous content, they will become less reliant 
on the tax credit, as they have established the essential assets 
needed to mitigate dangerous speech on their platforms.  If 
companies are incentivized to invest in content moderation, 
rather than being scared with the potential of endless liability, 
we will be closer to achieving our goal of creating safer platforms 




On April 25, 1995, an individual posted t-shirts on an online 
webpage that referred to the bombing of a federal building in 
Oklahoma City.1  The individual said in the online post that 
people interested in purchasing the t-shirts should call Ken 
Zeran, and included Zeran’s phone number.2  As a result of this 
prank, Zeran received a high number of derogatory messages 
and death threats.3 
The same post was made again on April 26, 1995, and 
“interested buyers were told to call Zeran’s phone number . . . 
and ‘please call back if busy’ due to high demand.”4  By April 30, 
1995, Zeran received a violent phone call approximately every 
two minutes.5  During this time period, Zeran notified America 
Online, Inc. (“AOL”), the owner of the website the post was 
written on, of the contents and extremities of the post.  AOL did 
not take down the post.6 
Can Zeran bring a successful lawsuit against AOL, the 
website operator, for defamatory speech of a third-party on 
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AOL’s webpage?7  No, Zeran cannot.8  The reason that Zeran and 
other victims of online defamatory statements cannot bring 
successful lawsuits against website operators is because of § 230 
of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”).9  “[Section] 230 
creates a federal immunity” to claims that try to make website 
operators “liable for information originating with a third-party 
user of the service.”10 
 
II. CONGRESS’ INTENT IN ENACTING § 230 
 
Congress enacted § 230 of the CDA on February 8, 1996.11  
The statute states, “[n]o provider or user of an interactive 
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of 
any information provided by another information content 
provider.”12  The term “interactive computer services” includes 
“anything from web hosts to websites to social media 
companies.”13  To analyze the statute by elements, § 230(c)(1) 
protects liability for “(1) a provider or user of an interactive 
computer service (2) whom a plaintiff seeks to treat . . . as a 
publisher or speaker (3) of information provided by another 
information content provider.”14 
Congress’ intentions for § 230 were, inter alia, to “promote 
the continued development of the Internet,” to preserve “the 
competitive free market that” exists for internet and computer 
services companies, and to “maximize user control over what 
information is received by individuals, families, and schools who 
use the Internet and other interactive computer services.”15 
Congress also enacted § 230 in response to court cases that 
 
7. See id. 
8. See id. at 330–35. 
9. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). 
10. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330. 
11. Id. at 334; see 47 U.S.C. § 230. 
12. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). 
13. Matt Laslo, The Fight Over Section 230–and the Internet as We Know 
It, WIRED (Aug. 13, 2019, 3:18 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/fight-over-
section-230-internet-as-we-know-it/; see also Fair Hous. Council of San 
Fernando Valley v. Roomates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1162 n.6 (9th Cir. 
2008) (“Today, the most common interactive computer services are websites.”). 
14. Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1100–01 (9th Cir. 2009); Fields 
v. Twitter, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 3d 1116, 1121 (N.D. Cal. 2016). 
15. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)–(3). 
3
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held website operators liable for “defamatory statements” posted 
by third parties on website operators’ message boards.16  For 
example, in Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Services Company, an 
unidentified user of Prodigy’s internet bulletin board titled 
“Money Talk” wrote a comment alleging that Stratton Oakmont 
and its President at the time committed “criminal and 
fraudulent acts in connection with the initial public offering of . 
. . Solomon-Page Ltd.”17  The New York Supreme Court 
determined that Prodigy controlled the content of its computer 
bulletin boards, as they had the technology to “delete notes from 
its computer bulletin boards on the basis of offensiveness and 
‘bad taste.’”18  The court concluded that Prodigy was liable for 
defamation committed by its users.19 
According to Congress, § 230 has spurred significant 
advances for internet and computer services companies in “the 
availability of educational and informational resources to our 
citizens.”20  Internet users have “a great deal of control over the 
information they receive,” and people are relying on “interactive 
media for . . . political, educational, cultural, and entertainment 
services.”21  The internet and interactive computer services offer 
a forum of discussion for political, educational, cultural, and 
entertainment matters.22 
Section 230 has helped shape the internet into the 
influential and valuable product it now is.  It has helped promote 
the free expression of different cultural views.23  The statute is 
 
16. Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 2016); see also 
Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 568 F.3d 1169, 1173–74 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 10, 208) (“One of the specific purposes of [§ 230] is to overrule 
Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions which have 
treated [Internet service] providers and users as publishers or speakers of 
content that is not their own because they have restricted access to 
objectionable material.”); Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 
31063/94, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995). 
17. Stratton Oakmont, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229, at *1–2. 
18. Id. at *10. 
19. Id. at *13–14. 
20. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(1). 
21. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(2), (5). 
22. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(3). 
23. See Felix Gillette, Section 230 Was Supposed to Make the Internet a 




2020 SUPPLEMENTING SECTION 230 285 
vital to the internet because it gives companies “broad leeway to 
moderate discussions” in a manner that is best suited for their 
company.24  This has allowed website operators to host a large 
array of “user-generated content,” which spurred the rise of the 
social media industry and information platforms like Google and 
YouTube.25  Felix Gillette emphasized the importance of § 230 to 
the internet when he stated, “[i]t’s no hyperbole to call Section 
230 the foundation on which the modern internet was built.”26  
Section 230 was intended to promote the growth of internet 
companies, while protecting them from defamatory statements 
of third-party users on their sites.27  The courts have 
emphatically protected § 230’s legislative intent to incentivize 
website operators to self-police the internet for obscene and 
offensive content, which has resulted in courts “almost always” 
granting immunity to website operators.28 
 
III. HOW COURTS HAVE INTERPRETED § 230 
 
The United States Supreme Court has not taken up a case 
concerning how courts should interpret § 230.29  Courts have 
construed § 230 broadly because website operators that display 
third-party content can have an “infinite number of users 
generating an enormous amount of potentially harmful 
content.”30  If website operators were held liable for all harmful 
 
24. Felix Gillette, The Little Law That Made the Internet a Free for All, 





26. Gillette, supra note 24; cf. Jae Hong Lee, Batzel v. Smith & Barrett v. 
Rosenthal: Defamation Liability for Third-Party Content on the Internet, 19 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 469, 491 (2004) (arguing that “the Internet is no longer 
in its infancy,” and therefore § 230 needs to be modified). 
27. See Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 18–19 (1st Cir. 2016); 47 
U.S.C. § 230(b)(1). 
28. See Patricia Spiccia, The Best Things in Life Are Not Free: Why 
Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act Should Be 
Earned and Not Freely Given, 48 VAL. U. L. REV. 369, 386 (2013); Blumenthal 
v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 52 (D.D.C. 1998). 
29. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).  This was the only case the 
Supreme Court has addressed concerning the CDA, but it has not addressed § 
230 of the CDA. 
30. Backpage.com, 817 F.3d at 18–19 (quoting Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 
5
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content on their sites, it would impose too great a burden on 
website operators to screen every post made on their site.31  
Courts have commonly held that “internet service providers, 
website exchange systems, online message boards, and search 
engines” fall within the “interactive computer service[s]” that § 
230 intends to protect.32 
When interpreting the plain language of § 230, the statute 
creates a broad immunity against “any cause of action that 
would make service providers liable for information originating 
with a third-party user of the service.”33  Plaintiffs who bring 
lawsuits against website operators under § 230(c)(1) usually 
bring claims of defamation, negligence, or intentional infliction 
of emotional distress against the website operator.34  Congress 
expanded § 230 protection for website operators against state 
and local laws under § 230(e)(3) which says “[n]o cause of action 
may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State 
or local law that is inconsistent with this section.”35  The 
ultimate question courts consider in analyzing § 230(c)(1) as a 
defense is whether the website operator is to be considered a 
“speaker” of the content that is at issue, or whether the website 
operator is a “publisher” exercising its traditional publisher 
 
129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997)); see also Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. 
Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 419 (1st Cir. 2007) (explaining that “the difficulty of 
separating lawful from unlawful speech, and the relative lack of incentives to 
protect lawful speech,” are why the courts should “broadly construe” Section 
230 immunity); Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th 
Cir. 2003) (describing the § 230(c) immunity as “quite robust”); Ben Ezra, 
Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 2000) 
(explaining that providing immunity to “publisher liability” is essential for a 
company to exercise “editorial and self-regulatory functions” without endless 
liability). 
31. Backpage.com, 817 F.3d at 18–19 (citing Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331). 
32. FTC v. LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 174 (2d Cir. 2016). 
33. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330; see also Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 
418 (5th Cir. 2008) (explaining that § 230(c)(1) provides “broad immunity” to 
website operators for “all claims stemming from their publication of 
information created by third parties”). 
34. Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1101–03 (9th Cir. 2009). 
35. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3); see also Benjamin Edelman & Abbey Stemler, 
From the Digital to the Physical: Federal Limitations on Regulating Online 
Marketplaces, 56 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 141, 176–77 (2019) (explaining that § 
230(e)(3) provides a “preemption clause” with the intention to encourage state 
laws targeted at internet companies). Otherwise, Congress would have just 
relied on the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution.  Id. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss1/7
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functions.36  The use of the term “publisher” in § 230 indicates 
Congress’ intention to “immunize service providers only from 
publisher liability.”37 
For the website operator to be the “speaker” of content, it 
must “directly and ‘materially’ contribute[] to what made the 
content itself ‘unlawful.’”38  Circuit courts have adopted a 
distinction between “taking actions (traditional to publishers) 
that are necessary to the display of unwelcome and actionable 
content and, on the other hand, responsibility for what makes 
the displayed content illegal or actionable.”39  A website operator 
can also be considered a “developer” of the content of third 
parties, which subjects the website operator to the same amount 
of liability as the “speaker” of the content.40  The website 
operator can be considered the “developer” of the third-party 
content if it “encourages or advises users to provide the specific 
actionable content” that brings about the lawsuit.41 
In FTC v. LeadClick Media, LLC, the Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit concluded that LeadClick “developed” the 
third parties’ content by giving instructions to the third parties 
on how to use false advertising that encouraged consumers to 
purchase the third parties’ weight-loss products.42  In Fair 
Housing Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, the defendant website 
operator developed questions, answers, and a search mechanism 
that encouraged discrimination in the way people can search for 
roommates.43  The decisions in LeadClick and Roommates.com 
 
36. See Backpage.com, 817 F.3d at 19 (citing Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1101–
02). 
37. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 332. 
38. Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 53, 68 (2d Cir. 2019). 
39. Jones v. Dirty World Ent. Recordings LLC, 755 F.3d 398, 414 (6th Cir. 
2014); see Kimzey v. Yelp! Inc., 836 F.3d 1263, 1269 (9th Cir. 2016); Fair Hous. 
Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1169–74 (9th Cir. 2008). 
40. Force, 934 F.3d at 68; 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3) (“The term ‘information 
content provider’ means any person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in 
part, for the creation or development of information provided . . .”). 
41. Force, 934 F.3d at 69; see FTC v. LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 
176 (2d Cir. 2016); Roomates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d at 1172. 
42. LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d at 176–77; see also Force, 934 F.3d 
at 69 (“LeadClick’s suggestions included adjusting weight-loss claims and 
providing legitimate-appearing news endorsements, [which] materially 
contribut[ed] to [the content’s] alleged unlawfulness.”). 
43. Roomates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d at 1165–68, 1172.  Roomates.com 
required users to provide protected characteristics, and the website hid some 
listings depending on the submissions.  Id. at 1167. 
7
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have opened up a slim path for plaintiffs to avoid § 230 barring 
their claim.44  An “interactive computer service” may apply § 230 
protection “only with respect to ‘information provided by another 
information content provider.’”45  But if the “interactive 
computer service” is also an “information content provider,” then 
the website operator is “not immune from liability arising from 
publication of that content.”46 
Parties who claim harm by a website operator’s publication 
of third-party content still have a source of recourse if the 
“interactive computer service” is not also the “information 
content provider.”47  The party may sue the third-party user that 
generated the content, but not the website operator that enabled 
the third-party to publish the content online.48  Plaintiffs are 
hesitant to pursue a claim against the speaker of the content 
because the speaker may not have the financial resources to pay 
damages, and the identity of the speaker may not be readily 
apparent. 
Unfortunately for plaintiffs, it is rare to find an interactive 
computer service that is also an information content provider.  
This leads to the dismissal of most § 230 cases.49  If the website 
operator is considered to be exercising its traditional publisher 
functions, the website operator is afforded immunity for the 
website operator’s “decisions with respect to that posting, but 
also for its inherent decisions about how to treat postings 
generally.”50  A website operator’s decisions in structuring its 
website, choosing what words and phrases can appear on the 
website, and deciding whether to “publish, withdraw, postpone, 
or alter content” are editorial choices that are considered 
 
44. See LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d at 175; FTC v. Accusearch Inc., 
570 F.3d 1187, 1197 (10th Cir. 2009). 
45. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d at 1197 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1)). 
46. Id.; see 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), (f)(2)–(3); Roomates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 
at 1162 (9th Cir. 2008); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online Inc., 206 
F.3d 980, 985 (10th Cir. 2000). 
47. See Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 419 (5th Cir. 2008); 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(c)(1), (f)(2)–(3). 
48. See MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d at 419. 
49. Gillette, supra note 24 (“Section 230 cases frequently result in the 
spectacle of a tech giant squashing the complaints of users and smaller 
websites.”). 
50. Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 20 (1st Cir. 2016) (quoting 
Universal Commc’n Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 422 (1st Cir. 2007)). 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss1/7
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“traditional publisher functions.”51  The website operator is 
generally only liable under § 230 if the party conducts “its own 
speech” on the website.52 
There was hope that courts would take a more critical 
stance towards § 230 when a more egregious group of bad actors, 
like “sites facilitating sex trafficking,” were involved.53  The case 
of Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC put a damper on these hopes.54 
In Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, the plaintiffs alleged that 
Backpage.com (“Backpage”) acted with the intention to facilitate 
sex traffickers’ efforts to advertise victims of sex trafficking on 
their website, and that Backpage’s rules and processes 
governing advertisements made sex trafficking easier to 
conduct.55  The plaintiffs were victims of sex trafficking which 
resulted from advertisements posted on Backpage.56  The 
advertisements posted on Backpage included images of the 
particular plaintiffs, usually taken by the traffickers.57  As a 
result of the advertisements, the plaintiffs were raped numerous 
times; two of the plaintiffs were allegedly raped 1,000 and 900 
times respectively by users of the website.58  The plaintiffs 
alleged that Backpage, “engaged in a course of conduct designed 
to facilitate sex traffickers’ efforts to advertise their victims on 
the website . . . [which] led to their victimization.”59 
Backpage provided online advertising, and allowed users of 
its site to post advertisements of categories that relate to the 
user’s product or service that is being sold.60  It hosted more than 
 
51. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d at 20–21 (citing Zeran v. Am. Online, 
Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997)); see Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co., 206 
F.3d at 986 (“Congress clearly enacted § 230 to forbid the imposition of 
publisher liability on a service provider for the exercise of its editorial and self-
regulatory functions.”). 
52. Hiam v. HomeAway.com, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 3d 338, 346 (D. Mass. 
2017) (quoting Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d at 419–20). 
53. Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin Wittes, The Problem Isn’t Just 
Backpage: Revising Section 230 Immunity, 2 GEO. L. TECH. REV. 453, 455 
(2018). 
54. Id. at 453. 
55. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d at 16. 
56. Id. at 17. 
57. Id. (noting that a small number of the photos were taken by the 
plaintiffs). 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at 16. 
60. Id. 
9
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eighty percent of the online advertising for “illegal commercial 
sex in the United States.”61  One of the categories on Backpage’s 
website was titled “Adult Entertainment,” which contained a 
subsection titled “Escorts.”62  Backpage had an automated 
filtering system that screened out advertisements containing 
certain prohibited terms, such as “barely legal” and “high 
school,” but the person posting the advertisement could 
implement similar phrases, such as “brly legal” or “high schl” 
which would circumvent the filtering system.63 
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit determined that 
Backpage was exercising traditional publisher functions.  
Backpage did not require phone or email verification for an 
account, nor the specific date, time, or location of the 
photographs in the advertisements, and Backpage’s rules 
allowed people to post in the future after they had entered a 
prohibited term in a previous post.64  The plaintiffs 
acknowledged that the content of the advertisements were 
provided by either the traffickers, or the plaintiffs themselves, 
not Backpage.65  Due to Backpage exercising traditional 
publisher functions, and not acting as the speaker of the content, 
§ 230(c)(1) barred the plaintiffs’ claim.66 
Courts have also rejected claims seeking to hold website 
operators liable for “failing to provide sufficient protections to 
users from harmful content created by others.”67  In Doe v. 
MySpace Incorporated, the plaintiffs sued MySpace Inc. 
(“MySpace”) alleging that MySpace failed to “implement basic 
safety measures to prevent sexual predators from 
communicating with minors on its web site.”68  The plaintiff’s 
daughter was thirteen years old when she created a MySpace 
account.69  The daughter lied on her Myspace profile and said 
that she was eighteen years old, which allowed her to evade the 
 
61. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 7, Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 
(No. 16-276). 
62. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d at 16. 
63. Id. at 17. 
64. Id. at 21. 
65. Id. at 19. 
66. Id. at 23–24. 
67. Id. at 21. 
68. Doe v. MySpace Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 416 (5th Cir. 2008). 
69. Id. 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss1/7
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safety features on the website and made her profile public.70  The 
daughter met a nineteen-year-old man on MySpace, and when 
the two met in person, the daughter was sexually assaulted by 
him.71 
The plaintiffs alleged that MySpace was not the publisher 
of the information, so § 230 would not protect MySpace from the 
plaintiffs’ claims.72  They alleged that their claim was predicated 
solely on “MySpace’s failure to implement basic safety measures 
to protect minors.”73  The district court and Fifth Circuit rejected 
the plaintiffs’ argument, holding that if MySpace had not 
published communications and contact information of the 
daughter and the nineteen-year-old, the two would have never 
met.74  MySpace was afforded § 230 protection because it 
exercised traditional public functions, and the plaintiffs’ claim 
was dismissed.75 
The Second Circuit applied a similar analysis when a 
plaintiff alleged that Grindr LLC, an online dating application, 
was “defectively designed and manufactured.”76  Plaintiff’s ex-
boyfriend “created Grindr profiles to impersonate [plaintiff],” 
and the ex-boyfriend directed other users on the application to 
plaintiff’s home and workplace.77  The court concluded that the 
plaintiff’s “ex-boyfriend’s online speech is precisely the basis of 
[plaintiff’s] claims that Grindr is defective and dangerous,” and 
that this claim is based on “information provided by another 
information content provider.”78  Grindr was afforded § 230 
immunity, and the court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim.79 
Currently, as long as the material was created by a third-




72. Id. at 419. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 419–20 (citing Doe v. MySpace Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 843, 849 
(W.D. Tex. 2007)).  In a similar 2002 case, the plaintiff argued that the 
defendant internet service provider failed to protect the user on its site, and 
the case was dismissed because it related to the defendant’s “monitoring, 
screening, and deletion of content from its network,” which are traditional 
publisher functions.  Green v. Am. Online, 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 2002). 
75. MySpace Inc., 528 F.3d at 422. 
76. Herrick v. Grindr LLC, 765 F. App’x 586, 588 (2d Cir. 2019). 
77. Id. 
78. Id. at 590. 
79. Id. at 591. 
11
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its development,” a website operator is granted “broad 
immunity” from § 230(c)(1).80  As the courts have afforded 
website operators § 230(c)(1) protection in situations of sex 
trafficking, death threats, sexual abuse, and other gruesome 
acts, debate emerges over whether § 230 needs to be remedied, 
and if so, is Congress, the courts, or the public consumers the 
best group to bring about that change. 
 
IV. SECTION 230(C)(2)’S GOAL TO ENCOURAGE CONTENT 
MONITORING, AND WHY IT FAILED 
 
While there are frequent claims from individuals being 
harmed by the content displayed on a website, there are also 
claims from individuals when the website operator modifies or 
removes third-party’s content.  Many individuals allege a 
deprivation of their free speech rights when a website operator 
modifies or removes their content from a site.81 
One goal of § 230 was to “encourage voluntary monitoring 
for offensive or obscene material” without fear of liability.82  The 
statute does not require website operators to filter offensive 
content,83  but states that website operators shall not be liable 
for “any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access 
to or availability of material that the provider or user considers 
to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, 
harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such 
material is constitutionally protected.”84  The purpose of § 
230(c)(2) is to provide internet companies a “safety net” with 
regards to filtering out content on their sites that the internet 
company deems to be offensive.85 
 
80. See Hugh T. McKeegan, When All You Have Is a Hammer, 80 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 191, 195 (2018). 
81. Ryan French, Comment, Picking Up the Pieces: Finding Unity After 
the Communications Decency Act Section 230 Jurisprudential Clash, 72 LA. L. 
REV. 443, 479 n.263 (2012). 
82. Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1099–1100 (9th Cir. 2009) 
(citing Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003)); 
see also Olivier Sylvain, Intermediary Design Duties, 50 CONN. L. REV. 203, 239 
(2018) (“Section 230(c)(2)(A) encourages websites to keep objectionable content 
out without fear of liability for failing to do so well.”). 
83. See Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civ. Rts. Under L., Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 
519 F.3d 666, 670 (7th Cir. 2008). 
84. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A). 
85. Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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Congress did not include every type of offensive speech in § 
230(c)(2), so courts have inferred that Congress likely intended 
to provide forms of discouraged content that “Congress could not 
identify in the 1990s.”86  Congress intended to give website 
operators “tools to avoid not only violent or sexually explicit 
materials, but also harassing materials.”87  Courts have taken 
this to signify that “[s]pam, malware and adware could fairly be 
placed close enough to harassing materials to at least be called 
‘otherwise objectionable.’”88 
A website operator has “unbridled discretion” under § 
230(c)(2) to block the online material based on the content of the 
post, and not because of the “identity of the entity that produced 
it.”89  Website operators have “robust statutory immunity” under 
§ 230(c)(2), allowing courts to adjudicate these cases in a more 
time and cost efficient manner and advance the courts’ interest 
in judicial economy.90  As long as the website operator exercised 
“good-faith efforts,” the website operator may screen and/or 
block third-party content.91 
Although § 230(c)(2) does provide “unbridled discretion,” 
website operators generally prefer to rely on § 230(c)(1) to defend 
their actions because § 230(c)(2) requires the website operator’s 
blocking and screening be made in “good faith.”92  “Plaintiffs 
always have incentives to contest the defendant’s good faith, 
which delays the court’s application of [§] 230(c)(2)’s immunity—
and sometimes overcomes it.”93 
 
86. Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC v. Malwarebytes, Inc., 938 F.3d 
1026, 1037 (9th Cir. 2019). 
87. Id. 
88. Id.; see also Holomaxx Techs. v. Microsoft Corp., 783 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 
1104–05 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (explaining that the challenger has to claim that the 
website operator acted in bad faith by removing the post); e360Insight, LLC v. 
Comcast Corp., 546 F. Supp. 2d 605, 608 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (concluding that 
extreme deference to the website operator’s subjective determination is 
permissible). 
89. Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC, 938 F.3d at 1033. 
90. Eric Goldman, Online User Account Termination and 47 U.S.C. § 
230(c)(2), 2 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 659, 671 (2012). 
91. Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 2016). 
92. Enigma Software Grp. USA, LLC, 938 F.3d at 1036; see Eric Goldman, 
The Ten Most Important Section 230 Rulings, 20 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 
1, 6 (2017). 
93. Goldman, supra note 92, at 6; see Goldman, supra note 90, at 671 
(arguing that the “good faith” aspect of § 230(c)(2) should be removed because 
it increases the chances that both parties will accumulate high adjudication 
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These concerns have been contrasted with strong policy 
arguments for the value of § 230(c)(2).  Eric Goldman, a 
Professor at the Santa Clara University School of Law, predicted 
two reasons why website operators will use § 230(c)(2) 
infrequently.94  Goldman argued that (1) website operators are 
reluctant to terminate customers from their sites because 
customers increase revenue for website operators; and (2) that 
website operators will be concerned with losing customer trust 
if they capriciously terminate accounts or remove posts.95  
Website operators want leeway to shape their website in a way 
that will engage customers and promote the free expression of 
consumers, which is important for growth.96 
Websites need some “provider intervention” to protect 
website users from other users and to prevent security or 
technical concerns.97  An additional challenge to modifying or 
removing third-party content is that flagging the content on a 
website requires an ample amount of resources.  The fear of 
being sued may cause online entrepreneurs to be hesitant in 
developing new applications, as they would have to “divert 
resources to defend the parade of lawsuits arising from illegal 
third-party conduct.”98 
Facebook has invested a lot of money into moderating 
content posted on its website, and its large investment has been 
insufficient in removing hate speech and misinformation from 
the platform. Facebook has 15,000 content moderators around 
the world who are responsible for reviewing “potentially 
objectionable content” and then making a decision as to whether 
 
costs just to reach a prevailing decision for the website operator). 
94. Goldman, supra note 90, at 672. 
95. Id.  Goldman’s article referred specifically to terminating user 
accounts under § 230(c)(2), but Goldman’s application can be evaluated when 
looking at all actions website operators can take under § 230(c)(2). 
96. See Gillette, supra note 24; Daphne Keller, The Stubborn, Misguided 
Myth that Internet Platforms Must Be ‘Neutral,’ WASH. POST (July 29, 2019, 
6:00 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/07/29/stubborn-
nonsensical-myth-that-internet-platforms-must-be-neutral/ (“If platforms 
couldn’t enforce content policies while retaining immunity, communications 
today would look a lot like they did in 1965.  We could passively consume the 
carefully vetted content created by big companies like NBC, . . . but we wouldn’t 
have many options in between.”). 
97. Goldman, supra note 90, at 670–71. 
98. Sylvain, supra note 82, at 244. 
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the content can remain on Facebook.99  Content moderators have 
been described as the closest parallel to first responders, as they 
are often the “first line of defense for reporting and responding 
to various crimes playing out online.”100  There are more than 
100,000 content moderators in the world, with some estimates 
as high as 150,000.101 
In just her first day as a content moderator, one of the 
moderators learned the emotional challenges that come with the 
job, as she saw, among other things, “anti-Semitic speech, 
bestiality photos and video of what seemed to be a girl and boy 
told by an adult off-screen to have sexual contact with each 
other.”102  Content moderators can be fired after making only “a 
handful of errors a week” in deciding to remove the content or 
allow the content to remain on the website.103  They are also 
developing “PTSD-like symptoms.”104  Commenters note that, 
“[m]oderators cope with seeing traumatic images and videos by 
telling dark jokes about committing suicide, then smoking weed 
during breaks to numb their emotions.”105  “Accenture, which 
 
99. Casey Newton, The Trauma Floor, VERGE (Feb. 25, 2019, 8:00 AM), 
https://www.theverge.com/2019/2/25/18229714/cognizant-facebook-content-
moderator-interviews-trauma-working-conditions-arizona; Lauren Weber & 
Deepa Seetharaman, The Worst Job in Technology: Staring at Human 
Depravity to Keep It off Facebook, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 27, 2017, 10:42 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-worst-job-in-technology-staring-at-human-
depravity-to-keep-it-off-facebook-1514398398. 
100. Benjamin Powers, The Human Cost of Monitoring the Internet, 
ROLLING STONE (Sept. 9, 2017, 1:00 PM), 
https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culture-features/the-human-cost-of-
monitoring-the-internet-202291/ (estimating that there are 150,000 content 
moderators as of 2017); see Casey Newton, What Tech Companies Should Do 
About Their Content Moderators’ PTSD, VERGE (Jan. 28, 2020, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.theverge.com/interface/2020/1/28/21082642/content-moderator-
ptsd-facebook-youtube-accenture-solutions (“[C]ontent moderation is often a 
dead-end career.”). 
101. Isaac Chotiner, The Underworld of Online Content Moderation, NEW 
YORKER (July 5, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/the-
underworld-of-online-content-moderation; Powers, supra note 100. 
102. Weber & Seetharaman, supra note 99. 
103. Newton, supra note 100. 
104. Id. 
105. Id.; see Elizabeth Dwoskin, et al., Content Moderators at YouTube, 
Facebook and Twitter See the Worst of the Web—and Suffer Silently, WASH. 
POST (July 25, 2019, 1:00 PM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/07/25/social-media-
companies-are-outsourcing-their-dirty-work-philippines-generation-workers-
is-paying-price/ (stating that moderators are expected to maintain accuracy 
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sells its content moderation services to Facebook, YouTube, and 
Twitter, among others, requires employees to acknowledge that 
their work can lead to PTSD.”106  Employing content moderators 
is a burdensome task for website operators that host large 
amounts of third-party content like Facebook and YouTube.  If 
fewer users are engaging in their services because companies are 
restricting harmful speech, the value of their applications is 
reduced.107 
Not only is there a high turnover rate with content 
moderators, content moderators require a lot of investment and 
resources.108  Facebook has 15,000 content moderators who get 
paid at an average salary of $28,800, totaling $432 million in 
labor costs for content moderators.109  That does not include the 
cost of equipment, the cost of developing strategies for content 
moderation, or the indirect costs of employing content 
moderators, such as having therapists to help them better cope 
with the content they are viewing.110  Although Facebook invests 
a lot of capital to monitor its platform, there is still a lot more 
Facebook needs to do to combat misinformation and hate speech, 
given the amount of people that use Facebook and rely on it to 
obtain news.111 
 
levels over ninety-five percent). 
106. Newton, supra note 100. 
107. Sylvain, supra note 82, at 244. 
108. Id.; see also The Daily, A Criminal Underworld of Child Abuse, Part 
1, N.Y. TIMES, at 16:08 (Feb. 19, 2020) (downloaded using Spotify) (noting that 
there is a high turnover rate for law enforcement officers involved in mitigating 
child sexual abuse imagery). 
109. Newton, supra note 100; see Rob Copeland & Tripp Mickle, Silicon 
Valley Was First to Send Workers Home. It’s Been Messy., WALL ST. J. (Mar. 14, 
2020, 9:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/silicon-valley-was-first-to-send-
workers-home-its-been-messy-11584190800?mod=business_lead_pos10 
(stating that during the COVID-19 outbreak, Facebook recommended its 
employees remain at home when feasible).  But Facebook required content 
moderators reviewing posts of urgent danger, “such as the policing of videos or 
images related to child abuse or pornography,” to remain at the office.  Id. 
110. Weber & Seetharaman, supra note 99. 
111. See Deepa Seetharaman, QAnon Booms on Facebook as Conspiracy 
Group Gains Mainstream Traction, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 13, 2020, 9:10 PM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/qanon-booms-on-facebook-as-conspiracy-group-
gains-mainstream-traction-11597367457 (noting that “Facebook groups have 
been central to building the QAnon network,” which is known for embracing 
many debunked conspiracy theories); Lukas I. Alpert, Coronavirus 
Misinformation Spreads on Facebook, Watchdog Says, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 20, 
2020, 10:29 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/coronavirus-misinformation-
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Content moderators have proven to help make websites 
safer, but content moderators will need a healthier work 
environment to prevent high employee turnover and emotional 
issues that result from the job.112  Content moderators need to 
be informed, before accepting the position, of the emotional 
challenges that come with the job.113  Companies also need to 
ensure strong mental health programs for content moderators 
and incorporate rotation programs for the content moderators to 
limit exposure to traumatic content in intermittent periods.114  
These investments will require substantial capital, but to 
sustain content moderation, website operators must promote a 
healthy work environment for content moderators. 
In September 2018, Twitter attempted to enact a policy 
similar to Facebook’s.115  Twitter will use artificial intelligence 
to combat speech that violates its policies, and users can report 
offensive tweets, but “the suspect tweets will always be reviewed 
by a human.”116  Twitter has only 1,500 content moderators, 
compared to around 15,000 content moderators at Facebook.117 
Twitter leaves dangerous content on its site instead of removing 
it by filtering to make the content not “immediately visible to a 
 
spreads-on-facebook-watchdog-says-11587436159 (finding that even though 
Facebook is making efforts to limit misinformation on COVID-19, there are 
many posts on Facebook “promoting bogus Covid-19 cures and conspiracy 
theories about the origins of the coronavirus”); Alexandra Stevenson, Facebook 
Admits It Was Used to Incite Violence in Myanmar, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/06/technology/myanmar-facebook.html 
(explaining that Facebook allowed misinformation and hate speech that 
“fuel[ed] modern ethnic cleansing in Myanmar,” and Myanmar military 
officials used misinformation on Facebook to cause the “murder, rape and 
forced migration” of Rohingya Muslims). 
112. Aidan O’Shea, Getting the Business of Content Moderation Right, 
VOXPRO, https://www.voxprogroup.com/millennials-and-workplace-




115. Sara Harrison, Twitter and Instagram Unveil New Ways to Combat 




117. Jason Koebler & Joseph Cox, How Twitter Sees Itself, VICE (Oct. 7, 
2019, 9:00 AM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/a35nbj/twitter-content-
moderation. 
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user.”118  Twitter has asserted that it wants to create a safer 
website, but the measures Twitter has put in place have not 
achieved its objectives.  Twitter has ignored the advice of 
scholars who have asked to help mitigate offensive speech on 
their platform.119  During the period of January 2019 through 
June 2019, 11.757 million accounts were reported for harmful 
content on Twitter.120 
The amount of content on these websites illustrates why 
these companies need § 230 immunity: 
 
According to the social media intelligence firm 
Brandwatch, there are about 3.2 billion images 
shared each day.  On Youtube there are 300 hours 
of video uploaded every minute.  On Twitter, 500 
million tweets are sent each day, which amounts 
to about 6,000 Tweets each second.  If two percent 
of the images uploaded daily are inappropriate, 
that means that on any given day, there may [be] 
64 million posts that violate a terms of service 
agreement alone.121   
 
This high volume of content shows the pressure facing 
website operators and the breadth of liability that website 
operators would be subject to without § 230 immunity.  Facebook 
and other large website operators have the resources to invest 
in content moderators, but most other smaller website operators 
are struggling to achieve profitability and do not have the 
resources to invest in modifying and removing offensive speech 
on their websites.122 
 
118. Id. 
119. See Deepa Seetharaman, Jack Dorsey’s Push to Clean Up Twitter 
Stalls, Researchers Say, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 15, 2020, 5:30 AM), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/jack-dorseys-push-to-clean-up-twitter-stalls-
researchers-say-11584264600?mod=business_lead_pos1. 
120. Id. (finding that during the January–June 2019 period, 4.551 million 
accounts were reported for harmful conduct about abuse, 5.202 million 
accounts were reported for posting hateful conduct, and 2.004 million accounts 
were reported for posting violent threats on Twitter). 
121. Powers, supra note 100. 
122. See Xin En Lee, No profit? No problem. Investors Keep Snapping up 
Loss-Making Companies, CNBC (Sept. 2, 2018, 2:40 PM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/29/no-profits-no-problem-the-economy-has-a-
growing-appetite-for-unprofitable-companies.html (noting that as of 2018, only 
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V. THE CRITICISM OFFERED TOWARDS § 230 
 
There are benefits that § 230 has advanced, which Congress 
has pointed out, but there are flaws with § 230 that need to be 
considered.  The district court in Blumenthal v. Drudge 
expressed concern about § 230 when it said: 
 
If it were writing on a clean slate, this Court 
would agree with plaintiffs. [A website operator] 
has certain editorial rights with respect to the 
content provided by [the third party] and 
disseminated by [the website operator], including 
the right to require changes in content and to 
remove it; . . . [b]ecause [a website operator] has 
the right to exercise editorial control over those 
with whom it contracts and whose words it 
disseminates, it would seem only fair to hold [the 
website operator] to the liability standards 
applied to a publisher or, at least, like a book store 
owner or a library, to the liability standards 
applied to a distributor.123 
 
The concern with content monitoring is that the guidelines 
for how to monitor the content of its users should be set by the 
legislature.124  The court in Blumenthal emphasized this concern 
when stating that companies should be responsible for 
monitoring users’ content, but they must oblige the legislative 
intent in § 230.125  Right now, the responsibility is up to website 
operators to initiate their own policies.  But if “all of the ‘big five’ 
 
seventeen percent of tech companies were profitable); Mike Masnick, Before 
Demanding Internet Companies ‘Hire More Moderators,’ Perhaps We Should 
Look at How Awful the Job Is, TECHDIRT (June 21, 2019, 10:44 AM), 
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20190619/17491542435/before-demanding-
internet-companies-hire-more-moderators-perhaps-we-should-look-how-
awful-job-is.shtml (stating that the only way to achieve content monitoring is 
to “hire a ton of people and subject them to absolutely horrific content over and 
over . . . again”). 
123. Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 51 (D.D.C. 1998). 
124. Kyle Langvardt, Regulating Online Content Moderation, 106 GEO. 
L.J. 1353, 1385 (2018). 
125. Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 52. 
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tech [companies]-Apple, Amazon, Facebook, Microsoft, and 
Alphabet . . . adopted a joint policy to suppress hate speech 
wherever they can,” we would be leaving “such a complex and 
momentous social decision to the boards of . . . private 
corporations clustered in the San Francisco and Seattle 
metropolitan areas.”126 
The legislature has provided increased criticism towards § 
230, with both political parties having negative sentiment 
towards the statute.127  Republican members of Congress have 
asserted that website operators have “suppress[ed] their 
viewpoints, arguing that the spirit of Section 230 is predicated 
on companies remaining politically neutral.”128  Democrats, on 
the other hand, express concern that tech companies often rely 
on § 230 “to ignore the collateral damage of their users’ bad 
behavior.”129  Even the former United States Attorney General, 
William Barr, has criticized § 230, although he said that the 
United States Department of Justice has not declared a position 
on the law.130  Attorney General Barr said, “[t]he early days of 
online public bulletin boards . . . have been replaced by platforms 
with sophisticated content moderation tools, algorithms, 
recommendation features, and targeting.  With these new tools, 
the line between passively hosting third-party speech and 
actively curating or promoting speech starts to blur.”131 
President Trump has been critical of social media companies 
flagging or removing speech by third-party users on their 
platforms when that speech violates the company’s policies.132  
 
126. Langvardt, supra note 124, at 1385. 
127. See Gillette, supra note 24. 
128. Id.; see also Anna Wiener, Trump, Twitter, Facebook, and the Future 
of Online Speech, NEW YORKER (July 6, 2020), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/letter-from-silicon-valley/trump-twitter-
facebook-and-the-future-of-online-speech (noting that the theory of 
conservative viewpoints being censored on social media is a “theory among 
conservatives . . . with no supporting data”). 
129. Gillette, supra note 24. 
130. See William P. Barr, Attorney General Dep’t of Justice, Opening 
Remarks at the DOJ Workshop on Section 230: Nurturing Innovation or 
Fostering Unaccountability? (Feb. 19, 2020). 
131. Id. 
132. Maggie Haberman & Kate Conger, Trump Signs Executive Order on 
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On May 28, 2020, President Trump issued an “Executive Order 
on Preventing Online Censorship,” arguing that social media 
companies have not acted in “good faith” in removing third-party 
content, and a company that removes third-party content in bad 
faith should lose its protection under § 230(c)(2).133  The 
Executive Order asks, among other things, the Federal 
Communications Commission (“FCC”) to declare what actions 
constitute restricting speech “in good faith,” in an attempt to 
limit the authority of website operators to moderate their own 
platforms.134 
Legal experts assert that the Executive Order is “toothless 
in terms of enforcement.”135  In general, the First Amendment 
“prohibits only governmental abridgment of speech.”136  The 
First Amendment does not apply to private entities when the 
private entity is providing a forum for speech, “because the 
private entity is not a state actor.”137  The FCC emphasized that 
President Trump’s Executive Order has no impact on website 
operators, stating that “the First Amendment and Section 230 
remain the law of the land and control here.”138  While we have 
yet to see substantive changes to § 230, Democrats and 
Republicans have both addressed discontent with the law,139 
marking a warning to website operators that change may be on 
the horizon. 
Some critics have suggested that “notice-based liability” 
would be a proper responsibility for website operators to 
 
133. Exec. Order No. 13925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079 (June 2, 2020). 
134. Id. 
135. Jon Swartz, Trump Executive Order to Punish Social-Media 
Platforms is Largely Toothless, Legal Experts Say, MARKETWATCH (May 29, 
2020, 12:35 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/trump-executive-order-
to-punish-social-media-platforms-is-largely-toothless-legal-experts-say-2020-
05-28; see Shirin Ghaffary, Trump’s Executive Order on Social Media Is Legally 
Unenforceable, Experts Say, VOX (May 28, 2020, 8:05 PM), 
https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/5/28/21273878/trump-executive-order-
twitter-social-media-section-230-free-speech-implications. 
136. Freedom Watch, Inc. v. Google Inc., No. 19-7030, 2020 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 16948, at *4 (D.C. Cir. May 27, 2020) (quoting Manhattan Cmty. Access 
Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1928 (2019)). 
137. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1930 (“The private entity may thus exercise 
editorial discretion over the speech and speakers in the forum.”). 
138. FCC, Statement by Commissioner Starks On Section 230 Executive 
Order (May 28, 2020), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-
364610A1.pdf. 
139. See Gillette, supra note 24. 
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uphold.140  “Notice-based liability” would impose liability on 
website operators for “third-party defamatory content only on 
proof of notice and subsequent failure to remove the defamatory 
content within a reasonable time.”141  The Fourth Circuit, 
dissatisfied with a notice-based liability argument, said that 
notice of a “potentially defamatory posting” thrusts the website 
operator “into the role of a traditional publisher.”142  The 
“traditional editorial functions” are exactly what § 230 is 
intended to protect.143  An additional issue with “notice-based 
liability” is that it does not prevent the harm from the third-
party content of being enacted.  Content moderators must 
determine whether the third-party content should be removed 
before more users see the content, but this is after the content 
has already been on the website for users to see.144 
With “notice-based liability,” the damage would already be 
done by the time content moderators review the content, and the 
website operator would feel forced to remove the content out of 
concern for defamation liability.145  It would be impossible for 
“notice-based liability” to be applied equally because website 
operators have different amounts of resources to allocate to 
content monitoring.  The companies that do not have the 
resources to invest in content monitoring would receive notice of 
the third-party content too late, making them unable to mitigate 
the damage.  The companies that do have the resources to invest 
in content monitoring would be subject to defamation and free 
speech liability every time a content moderator makes a decision 
 
140. Vanessa S. Browne-Barbour, Losing Their License to Libel: 
Revisiting § 230 Immunity, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1505, 1532–33 (2015). 
141. Id. at 1507. 
142. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir. 1997). 
143. Id. at 330 (“[L]awsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its 
exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions—such as deciding 
whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content—are barred.”). 
144. See Queenie Wong, Facebook Content Moderation Is an Ugly 
Business. Here’s Who Does It, CNET (June 19, 2019, 12:53 PM), 
https://www.cnet.com/news/facebook-content-moderation-is-an-ugly-business-
heres-who-does-it/ (explaining that the content has already been on the website 
before content moderators must decide to allow or remove the post). 
145. See Susan Freiwald, Comparative Institutional Analysis in 
Cyberspace: The Case of Intermediary Liability for Defamation, 14 HARV. J.L. 
& TECH. 569, 640–41 (2001) (noting that “notice-based liability” would lead to 
a reduced level of online speech, and First Amendment concerns as website 
operators would “find it easier just to remove the posting rather than 
investigate”). 
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to permit or remove a post, which raises the concern of endless 
litigation that the legislature and courts feared.146 
The criticism towards § 230 emerges from our innovative 
technology sector.  The United States is very innovative; our 
technology and economy grow at a much faster rate than our 
legal system can keep up with.147  Innovation in the technology 
sector illustrates not only that website operators need § 230, but 
public citizens need it as well because the customs of public 
citizens adapt to advances in technology.  Individuals “love what 
Section 230 does for them,”148 and politicians think of § 230 as a 
Facebook and Twitter problem instead of looking at the internet 
in totality.  Website operators that rely on generating content 
from third-party users (i.e., Yelp, Reddit, etc.) would be crushed 
without the protection of § 230,149 disrupting the innovation 
developed through many website operators on the internet. 
A 2019 Pew Research Report showed that fifty-five percent 
of Americans get their news from social media “either ‘often’ or 
‘sometimes,’” an eight percent increase from 2018.150  As social 
media becomes more important in relaying news to the public, 
the public expects more content moderation in regulating 
disinformation on websites.151  Most news sources do not receive 
§ 230 immunity.152  If social media has been injected into the role 
 
146. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331 (“Interactive computer services have 
millions of users . . . [and] [t]he specter of tort liability . . . would have an 
obvious chilling effect.  It would be impossible for service providers to screen 
each of their millions of postings for possible problems.”). 
147. Julia Griffith, A Losing Game: The Law Is Struggling to Keep Up 
with Technology, J. HIGH TECH. L. (Apr. 12, 2019), 
https://sites.suffolk.edu/jhtl/2019/04/12/a-losing-game-the-law-is-struggling-
to-keep-up-with-technology/ (“Technology seems to be advancing at a rate that 
the law simply cannot keep up with.  It has been estimated that the law is at 
least five years behind developing a technology.”). 
148. Wiener, supra note 128. 
149. Id. 
150. Peter Suciu, More Americans Are Getting Their News from Social 
Media, FORBES (Oct. 11, 2019, 10:35 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/petersuciu/2019/10/11/more-americans-are-
getting-their-news-from-social-media/#6b7b60673e17; see also 47 U.S.C. § 
230(a)(5) (“Increasingly Americans are relying on interactive media for a 
variety of political, educational, cultural, and entertainment services.”). 
151. Carys Afoko, Government Can’t Regulate Facebook – It’s Up to All of 
Us, GUARDIAN (Apr. 1, 2019, 2:00 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/apr/01/government-
regulate-facebook-mark-zuckerberg-social-media. 
152. See Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 51 (D.D.C. 1998) (noting 
23
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of conveying the news, the public wants them to take a more 
proactive approach in flagging misinformation and ensuring 
that the news conveyed is informative.  But social media was 
founded on connecting people all around the world.  The 
evolution of social media into a news outlet for most Americans 
is a new responsibility. Social media companies are again 
fearing the consequence of restricting free speech and the limits 
of their § 230 immunity.153 
 
VI. THE SOLUTION: MAINTAIN § 230, BUT RESOLVE THIS 
INTERNET PROBLEM THROUGH TAX CREDITS 
 
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit emphasized the 
financial and legal problems that will arise to website operators 
by making them responsible for content that third parties post 
on their websites.154  The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
recognized the burden placed on website operators by imposing 
the need to monitor content by stating, “[i]t would be impossible 
for service providers to screen each of their millions of postings 
for possible problems.”155  These challenges are compounded by 
the fact that only seventeen percent of tech companies are 
profitable, and most of them do not have the cash on hand to 
devote to monitoring content and to finance substantial 
increases in legal costs.156  If Congress ends or limits § 230 
protection for website operators, it could significantly reduce the 
topics discussed on the internet, as well as the number of users 
speaking on websites.157  Legal experts have echoed the negative 
financial impact that revoking § 230 would have on website 
operators in asserting: 
 
that if the court had the chance to do it all over again, it would have given 
website operators a similar level of liability as news distributors). 
153. See generally The Impact of Social Media: Is it Irreplaceable?, 
WHARTON (July 26, 2019), 
https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/impact-of-social-media/ 
(“[S]ocial media . . . continues to evolve at lightning speed, making it tricky to 
predict which way it will morph next.”). 
154. Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 18–19 (1st Cir. 2016); see 
also Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997). 
155. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331 (explaining that website operators would feel 
pressured to “severely restrict the number and type” of content posted on sites 
if not afforded § 230 immunity). 
156. Lee, supra note 122. 
157. Goldman, supra note 90, at 671. 
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Without Section 230, only platforms with the 
resources for constant litigation would survive; 
even there, user-generated content would be 
heavily restricted in service of diminished 
liability.  Social-media startups might fade away, 
along with niche political sites, birding message 
boards, classifieds, restaurant reviews, support-
group forums, and comments sections.  In their 
place would be a desiccated, sanitized, corporate 
Internet—less like an electronic frontier than a 
well-patrolled office park.158 
 
Limiting or removing § 230 is not the solution; Congress 
needs to incentivize website operators to invest in monitoring 
third-party content on its websites through a tax credit.159  
Website operators are generally not the creators of the harmful 
messages on their websites, but intermediaries in publishing the 
posts.160  In serving as intermediaries, website operators should 
be encouraged to take part in the solution, not be scared with 
the threat of liability. 
Large companies that are investing in initiatives to reduce 
harmful content on their websites are seeing positive results.161  
The European Union reported that Facebook, Google, 
Instagram, Twitter, and YouTube removed an average of 
seventy-two percent of hate speech on their platforms during 
2018, and eighty-nine percent of “content flagged as hate speech 
was reviewed by [these companies] within 24 hours, up from 40 
percent in 2016.”162  Some companies are also using artificial 
 
158. Wiener, supra note 128. 
159. Patrick J. Lipaj, Opportunity in Ohio: Rethinking Northeast Ohio’s 
Opportunity Zones with Local Legislation, 68 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 835, 852 (2020) 
(citation omitted) (“Tax credits offset the amount of tax due, meaning that a $1 
tax credit saves $1 in tax for taxpayers in every tax bracket on their gross 
income.”). 
160. See Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 852 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(citing Delfino v. Agilent Techs., Inc., 52 Cal. Rptr. 3d 376, 387 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2006)). 
161. Elizabeth Schulze, EU Says Facebook, Google, and Twitter Are 
Getting Faster at Removing Hate Speech Online, CNBC (Feb. 4, 2019, 12:07 
PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/02/04/facebook-google-and-twitter-are-
getting-faster-at-removing-hate-speech-online-eu-finds--.html. 
162. Id.  In 2016, these companies only removed twenty-eight percent of 
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intelligence and algorithms to detect hateful speech on their 
websites.163  While these initiatives are not going to completely 
eliminate dangerous content on these websites, they help  reduce 
offensive speech online.164  We must encourage all companies to 
take these actions, and the best way to get companies that do 
not have the capital to invest in content monitoring to take part 
is for Congress to provide tax incentives. 
Investing in content monitoring requires an immense 
amount of capital.  Facebook has 15,000 content moderators, and 
Google has 10,000 employees working to mitigate hate speech on 
its platform.165  When these companies include the costs of 
building and maintaining the artificial intelligence to monitor 
hateful content, the costs become significant.166  This is an 
unreasonable task to ask every website operator to invest in 
 
hate speech on its platform.  Id.  Facebook and Instagram have removed 82.4% 
and 70.6% of hate speech respectively; Google and YouTube have removed 
80.0% and 85.4% respectively; Twitter has removed 43.5%.  Id.; see also Billy 
Perrigo, Facebook Says It’s Removing More Hate Speech than Ever Before. But 
There’s a Catch., TIME (Nov. 27, 2019, 4:42 AM), 
https://time.com/5739688/facebook-hate-speech-languages/ (“Facebook 
removed more than seven million instances of hate speech in the third quarter 
of 2019, . . . an increase of 59% [from] the previous quarter.”). 
163. Perrigo, supra note 162 (“Facebook [can] now automatically detect 
80% of hateful posts without needing a user to have reported them first.”); see 
also Seetharaman, supra note 119 (explaining that Twitter has discussed 
initiatives to use artificial intelligence to detect hateful speech, but these 
efforts have not come to fruition). 
164. Perrigo, supra note 162 (explaining that Facebook’s algorithm covers 
around forty languages, leaving hateful speech in the many other languages 
undiscovered by the algorithm); see also Shirin Ghaffary, The Algorithms that 
Detect Hate Speech Online Are Biased Against Black People, VOX (Aug. 15, 
2019, 11:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/8/15/20806384/social-
media-hate-speech-bias-black-african-american-facebook-twitter (discussing a 
study finding that artificial intelligence models for processing hate speech were 
one-and-a-half  times more like to detect and flag tweets as hateful when 
written by African Americans).  “[The models were] 2.2 times more likely to 
flag tweets written in African American English (which is commonly spoken 
by black people in the US).”  Id. 
165. Newton, supra note 100; Schulze, supra note 161; Perrigo, supra note 
162 (adding that Facebook has content moderators working “24 hours a day, 
seven days a week”). 
166. These large companies have not disclosed the costs of their 
algorithms intended to remove hate speech.  See Kirsten Grind et al., How 
Google Interferes with Its Search Algorithms and Changes Your Results, WALL 
ST. J. (Nov. 15, 2019, 8:15 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-google-
interferes-with-its-search-algorithms-and-changes-your-results-11573823753 
(noting that Google rarely releases information on its algorithms). 
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without Congress providing some assistance. 
Critics may argue that we should not be using the Internal 
Revenue Code (“IRC”) as a solution to make platforms safer.167  
They argue that the IRC “should not be used for social policy 
purposes,” but rather social policies should be funded directly 
and openly by the government.168  But the tax code has been used 
many times by the federal and state governments to directly 
impact specific industries,169 and a tax credit has the same 
financial impact as direct funding from the government while 
also being easier legislation to enact. 
In 1992, Congress enacted The Renewable Electricity 
Production Tax Credit (“PTC”), which today allows energy 
companies a tax credit “for electricity generated using qualified 
energy resources.”170  The PTC amounts to the product of “1.5 
cents, multiplied by . . . the kilowatt hours of electricity . . . 
produced by the taxpayer . . . from qualified energy resources . . 
. that are sold by the taxpayer to an unrelated person during the 
taxable year.”171  The primary reason for originally enacting 
these tax subsidies was to encourage the United States to 
become more energy independent and competitive with fossil 
fuels as the United States was importing a lot of its oil supply.172  
Congress also believed that the PTC was important to benefit 
the public as the PTC would contribute to reduce greenhouse 
emissions and pollution, which would benefit “society as a 
 
167. Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Shaping Code, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 
319, 382 (2005) (explaining that, among other concerns, an objection that 
critics raise to using “tax expenditures” being implemented to advance 
economic issues is that the “tax expenditures will place too high of an 
administrative burden on the IRS”). 
168. Id. (citing Bernard Wolfman, Federal Tax Policy and the Support of 
Science, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 171 (1965)) (making the argument that direct 
subsidies to individuals and entities are a better solution than through tax 
expenditures). 
169. Kesan & Shah, supra note 167, at 383. 
170. CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43453, THE RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY 
PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT: IN BRIEF 1 (2018).  “Qualified energy resources” 
means, among other things, wind, solar energy, geothermal energy, and 
hydropower production.  I.R.C. § 45(c)(1). 
171. I.R.C. § 45(a)(1)–(2). 
172. Merrill Matthews, It’s Time to Hit the Off Switch for Solar, Wind 
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whole.”173  While a tax break for website operators hosting third-
party content would have the objective of improving the 
industry, it would also provide a benefit to the public by creating 
a safer environment on the internet. 
When policies benefit the public as a whole, those policies 
will look to be incorporated globally.  More than fifty percent of 
the world’s “renewable energy subsidies” are provided by 
countries in the European Union (“EU”), and other countries 
such as Canada, Japan, Australia, Israel, China, and India have 
invested in renewable energy subsidies.174  Content moderation 
has also seen a global response, illustrating the global mission 
to mitigate online harmful content.  In 2016, the EU enacted a 
“Code of Conduct on countering illegal hate speech online” with 
Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter, and YouTube, which encouraged 
these companies to flag illegal hate speech and dispose of it in 
an appropriate time frame.175  By the end of 2018, most of these 
companies saw significant progress in flagging and removing 
hateful content; Google, Instagram, Snapchat, and Dailymotion 
decided to join the Code of Conduct in 2018.176  The EU’s action 
helps show that content moderation is a global issue and that 
advancements in content moderation will benefit the public.  The 
companies that joined the Code of Conduct (besides 
Dailymotion) are worth billions of dollars, illustrating that it is 
more difficult for smaller companies to invest in content 
moderation. 
We have also seen vital tax credits aimed at increasing 
research and development (“R&D”) expenses across all 
industries.177  The Research Tax Credit seeks to “encourage[] 
 
173. CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43453, THE RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY 
PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT: IN BRIEF 10 (2018). 
174. Mark Wu & James Salzman, The Next Generation of Trade and 
Environment Conflicts: The Rise of Green Industrial Policy, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 
401, 419–20 (2014). 
175. Věra Jourová, Code of Conduct on Countering Illegal Hate Speech 
Online: First Results on Implementation, EUR. COMM’N (Dec. 7, 2016), 
https://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/image/document/2016-
50/factsheet-code-conduct-8_40573.pdf. 
176. Ana Garcia Valdivia, EU and IT Companies Make Significant 




177. GARY GUENTHER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL31181, RESEARCH TAX 
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business[es] to invest more in R&D than they otherwise 
would”178 and reduces the tax burden on industries that require 
high amounts of R&D costs to get their product to market.179  
The IRC provides an R&D tax credit for any “qualified research 
expenses,” allowing companies to receive a tax credit for around 
twenty percent of R&D expenses.180 
R&D tax credits have been crucial to industries that require 
a lot of capital investment, like the pharmaceutical industry.181  
Estimates suggest that the cost of a pharmaceutical 
manufacturer to develop a new drug is “between $150 to $240 
million,” with an additional $300 million more needed for “post 
approval research.”182  The high amount of capital investment 
for pharmaceutical companies comes with the risk that “[a]bout 
85% of drug research projects fail before they are tested in 
human clinical trials.”183  Investing in content moderation will 
not require the same amount of capital investment as industries 
like the pharmaceutical industry, but the investment will be a 
huge financial burden for website operators and will require 
trial and error to develop strong algorithms and a healthy work 
environment for content moderators.  Tax credits “have long 
been used to support technological development,”184 and 
Congress should welcome the opportunity to be a part of the 
solution to a safer internet. 
A tax incentive for website operators is not a permanent 
solution.  The objective would be for the legislature to help 
website operators manage the initial costs of content 
moderation, and once website operators have properly 
 
CREDIT: CURRENT LAW AND POLICY ISSUES FOR THE 114TH CONGRESS (2015). 
178. Id. 
179. Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., Pharmaceutical Policy in the United 
States in 2019: An Overview of the Landscape and Avenues for Improvement, 
30 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 421, 428–29 (2019) (noting that it can cost a 
pharmaceutical company approximately $2.6 billion to develop a new drug, and 
the tax credit for R&D assists in managing the high amount of capital 
investment). 
180. I.R.C §§ 41(a), 174.  Section 174 provides that R&D “paid or incurred 
. . . during the taxable year in connection with [taxpayer’s] trade or business 
as expenses,” rather than capital expenses are to be treated as a deduction 
instead of a tax credit.  Id. 
181. Kesselheim et al., supra note 179, at 429–30. 
182. Id. at 429. 
183. Id. at 430. 
184. Kesan & Shah, supra note 167, at 383. 
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incorporated the costs of content moderation into their budgets, 
then the companies would no longer need the tax credit.  While 
the PTC has been great for renewable energy globally, there is 
growing concern that no one would invest in wind and solar 
energy in the United States without the benefit of tax credits.185  
A tax incentive is essential for website operators as they make 
initial capital investment into content moderation,186 and once 
they learn how to consistently incorporate these costs into their 
income statements, the website operators would hopefully not 
need the tax credit. 
Website operators will need a tax credit to help mitigate the 
additional costs because they will face a learning curve in 
implementing content moderation strategies.  Twitter explained 
in its 2018 Annual Report that as more users and content enters 
its site, it may become “increasingly difficult to maintain and 
improve the performance of [Twitter’s] products and services, . . 
. as [Twitter’s] products and services become more complex and 
user traffic increases.”187  Twitter also acknowledged that it 
wants to target hate speech and spam accounts through 
launching algorithms, which will “require significant resources 
and time.”188  While Facebook has invested a lot in content 
moderation, not everything has gone smoothly.189  Patience is 
required to allow these companies to find what content 
moderation strategy is best for them.  These companies are 
helping the economy by investing “significant resources and 
time,”190 and we need to encourage them to experiment and come 
up with a solution they think is best.  A tax credit will prevent 
 
185. See Matthews, supra note 172; Michael Bastasch, Warren Buffett: I 
Build Wind Turbines to Lower My Corporate Taxes, DAILY CALLER (May 6, 
2014, 2:55 PM), https://dailycaller.com/2014/05/06/warren-buffett-i-build-
wind-turbines-to-lower-my-corporate-taxes/ (explaining that Berkshire 
Hathaway and other companies Warren Buffett owns invest in wind turbines 
for the purpose of obtaining a tax credit). 
186. See O’Shea, supra note 112 (suggesting that artificial intelligence is 
an excellent tool to flag and remove harmful content, but content moderators 
are also needed to flag and remove the content that is challenging for artificial 
intelligence to detect). 
187. Twitter, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 23 (Feb. 20, 2019). 
188. Id. at 25; see also Microsoft Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 24 
(Aug. 1, 2019) (“Compliance with [online content] regulation[s] may involve 
significant costs or require changes in products or business practices that 
result in reduced revenue.”). 
189. Ghaffary, supra note 164. 
190. Twitter, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 25 (Feb. 20, 2019). 
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these companies from rushing an unequipped solution, and it 
will provide the financial assurance to develop content 
moderation systems designed to have long-term success. 
While a tax incentive for website operators to invest in 
content moderation will entice investment in the short-term, 
long-term success in content moderation is dependent on 
companies accepting content moderation costs as regular 
operating costs.  The solution and action by website operators 
will be more organic if they believe investing in content 
moderation is the right thing to do, versus investing to receive a 
tax credit.191  Some companies may not invest in content 
moderation, but if the majority of website operators invest in 
assets that mitigate dangerous content on their websites, then 
laggards that are not investing in content moderation will be 
encouraged to invest as a matter of public policy. 
 
VII. WHY A TAX CREDIT IS A BETTER SOLUTION THAN A DIRECT 
SUBSIDY OR TAX DEDUCTION 
 
Congress can create business development through multiple 
types of tax and funding initiatives.192  The legislature has, 
among other things, provided direct subsidies to industries, 
offered tax deductions to industries, and offered tax credits to 
industries.  Direct subsidies would fulfill a similar goal to the 
tax credit by getting money directly to website operators, but it 
would face more difficult political challenges than a tax credit193 
because tax credits have “much lower visibility than a direct 
spending program . . . [and the credit is] hidden in the tax 
code.”194 
As tax law can be difficult for the public to understand, most 
politicians avoid political backlash for their votes on tax 
 
191. See O’Shea, supra note 112 (explaining that the companies that 
invest enough to establish strong artificial intelligence and a healthy 
environment for content moderators will be in the best position to have a safe 
website for users). 
192. Kesan & Shah, supra note 167, at 380–81 (“Commonly, justifications 
of government intervention are based on a form of market failure.”). 
193. Id. 
194. Id. at 381 (“[A] tax expenditure is still government spending; 
virtually any tax expenditure provision could be rewritten in the form of a 
direct spending program.”). 
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credits.195  Dan T. Coenen explained the benefit to politicians of 
the difficulty of tax law to understand by stating: 
 
Most people view tax structures (especially tax 
structures applicable to corporations and other 
businesses) as an esoteric specialty beyond their 
capabilities and willingness to understand.  A 
failure to understand breeds a failure to second-
guess, and a failure to second-guess implies that 
tax structures will, more readily than monetary 
subsidies, escape political opposition.196 
 
A subsidy for website operators to incentivize investment in 
content moderation could generate a negative viewpoint as the 
public may not like Facebook and other billion-dollar 
corporations receiving direct subsidies from taxpayer dollars.197  
Politicians will face less risk pursuing a tax credit,198 and with 
both political parties expressing interest in improving § 230,199 
a tax credit is politically safer than a direct subsidy. 
Tax deductions as a solution for website operators would 
also be insufficient, as it would not provide enough of an 
incentive for website operators to invest in content moderation.  
A company may deduct any “ordinary and necessary expenses 
paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade 
or business.”200  Companies list content moderation costs under 
“Operating Expenses,” as R&D, until the content moderation 
system is fully implemented, where it would then be part of the 
“cost of revenue.”201  A company can deduct these expenses from 
 
195. Dan T. Coenen, Business Subsidies and the Dormant Commerce 
Clause, 107 YALE L.J. 965, 992 (1998). 
196. Id. 
197. Id. at 993 (“Subsidies may be looked upon more unfavorably because 
they are symptomatic of large and meddlesome government, while tax 
exemptions seem to comport with limited government and the value of private 
initiative.”). 
198. See id. at 994; Kesan & Shah, supra note 167, at 381 (citation 
omitted) (“[M]any politicians who regard themselves as fiscally conservative 
would rather use a tax expenditure than support another ‘big government 
spending program’ — a key component to the popularity of tax expenditures.”). 
199. See Gillette, supra note 24. 
200. I.R.C. § 162(a). 
201. Microsoft Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 51, 59, 60 (Aug. 1, 2019). 
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its net income as an “ordinary and necessary [business] 
expense,”202 and they should be able to keep deducting content 
moderation expenses, but an additional tax credit will lift a huge 
financial burden off of these companies.  Twitter and Microsoft 
acknowledged that investing in content moderation will require 
“significant costs” and time and may also lead to a reduction in 
revenues for website operators.203  We want to incentivize 
investment in content moderation, not intimidate website 
operators with overwhelming costs. 
In this hypothetical example, Company A had $1,000 in 
revenue for the taxable year, and $100 in content moderation 
costs.204  If the content moderation costs are a tax deduction as 
an “ordinary and necessary expense,”205  Company A would 
deduct the $100 in content moderation costs from the $1,000 in 
revenue, resulting in the company having $900 for its adjusted 
gross income.206  Assuming there were no other possible 
deductions, Company A would have a Net Taxable Income of 
$900.  If the hypothetical tax rate were twenty percent, 
Company A would have to pay $180 in taxes to the Internal 
Revenue Service (“IRS”).207 
If Company A’s content moderation costs were a tax credit, 
rather than a tax deduction, Company A would have no 
deductions, and $1,000 in Net Taxable Income.  With the 
hypothetical tax rate of twenty percent, Company A would have 
a Gross Tax of $200.  But as a tax credit, the content moderation 
costs would be subtracted from the Gross Tax, making it a 
dollar-for-dollar reduction in Company A’s tax bill.208  Therefore, 
 
202. I.R.C. § 162(a). 
203. Microsoft Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 24 (Aug. 1, 2019); 
Twitter, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 25 (Feb. 20, 2019). 
204. Assume for this example that there are no other expenses and 
deductions that need to be implemented. 
205. I.R.C. § 162(a). 
206. JOEL S. NEWMAN ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION CASES, PROBLEMS, 
AND MATERIALS 4–6 (7th ed. 2019).  The formula for calculating the tax bill 
owed to the IRS, in general, is: Gross Revenue minus Deductions equals Net 
Taxable Income.  The Net Taxable Income multiplied by the applicable tax rate 
results in the Gross Tax.  The Gross Tax minus Credits and Prepayments 
equals the amount owed to the IRS or the refund the taxpayer will receive.  See 
id. 
207. See id. 
208. See Tina Orem, Tax Credits Save You More than Deductions: Here 
Are the Best Ones, USA TODAY (Mar. 28, 2017, 1:07 PM), 
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Company A’s $100 in content moderation costs would be 
subtracted from its Gross Tax of $200, leaving Company A with 
a tax bill of $100 due to the IRS.  The content moderation costs 
as a tax deduction only reduced Company A’s tax bill by $20,209 
but when used as a tax credit, Company A reduced its tax bill by 
$100.  While tax credits are a “dollar-for-dollar reduction in your 
actual tax bill,” a deduction just lowers the taxable income.210 
Section 230 has maintained its importance mostly because 
of cost.  The concerns over endless liability without § 230 
continue,211 and now we must consider the resources companies 
will need to improve content moderation into the cost analysis.  
Section 230, in maintaining its present condition, will give 
companies time to implement their content moderation 
strategies, and a tax credit will help ensure the companies have 
capital to take on the investment.212  This would help companies 
avoid the question of whether to invest in content moderation 




Congress states that one of the many reasons it enacted § 
230 was “to remove disincentives for the development and 
utilization of blocking and filtering technologies . . . to restrict . 
. . access to objectionable or inappropriate online material.”213  
While removing disincentives benefits companies, we must 
prioritize creating incentives for these companies to invest the 




209. If there were no content moderation costs, Company A would have 
had a Net Taxable Income of $1,000. Company A’s Net Taxable Income 
multiplied by the hypothetical twenty percent tax rate would have imposed a 
$200 tax bill on Company A. 
210. Orem, supra note 208. 
211. Airbnb, Inc. v. City of Bos., 386 F. Supp. 3d 113, 122 (D. Mass. 2019) 
(citing Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 18 (1st Cir. 2016)) (“Congress’[] 
desire [was] to ‘allow[] website operators to engage in blocking and screening 
of third-party content, free from liability for such good-faith efforts.’”). 
212. See Twitter, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) 25 (Feb. 20, 2019) 
(noting that the company will need to devote a significant amount of time and 
resources to implement a strong content moderation strategy). 
213. 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4). 
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been known to lag in regulating the private sector.214  That must 
change.  There is a common goal between Congress, companies, 
and the public to make websites safer.  If Congress enacts a tax 
credit for companies that invest in content moderation, that 
benefit will spur investment in content moderation, which will 
help establish a safer internet for the public.  The times of 
scaring website operators with liability must end, and the 
solution must reside in collaboration. 
 
 
214. Griffith, supra note 147 (“[T]he law is at least five years behind 
developing a technology.”). 
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